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“OPERATIONAL PREPARATION OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT”: “INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY” OR 
“COVERT ACTION” BY ANY OTHER NAME?
Joshua kuyers1
i. inTroducTion
During its preparation of  the House Report for the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2010, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (House Intelligence Committee) 
publicly criticized the Department of  Defense (DoD) for frequently labeling military activities 
as “Operational Preparation of  the Environment” (OPE).2 The House Intelligence Committee 
scathingly opined that “overuse of  the term has made the distinction [between traditional military 
activities and intelligence functions] all but meaningless,” and that DoD “appl[ies] the OPE label 
where the slightest nexus of  a theoretical, distant military operation might one day exist.”3 The 
House Intelligence Committee even threatened that it would “consider legislative action clarifying 
the Department’s obligation” to report its “intelligence activities,” if the DoD remained reticent in 
its reporting.4
Indeed, as the House Intelligence Committee noted, the United States government’s recent 
activities demonstrate that the “traditional” distinction between military and intelligence operations 
has become blurred.5 For instance, both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the DoD utilize 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, known colloquially as “drones,” to conduct missile strikes against 
al Qaeda and al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist elements around the globe.6 The legal framework that 
1 Joshua Kuyers is a Law Fellow at the Public International Law & Policy Group. He has worked on issues of  national 
security law and public international law with the Department of  State Office of  the Legal Adviser, the Department of  
Defense Office of  General Counsel, and the Department of  the Navy Office of  the General Counsel. He graduated 
magna cum laude from American University Washington College of  Law in 2013. The views expressed in this article are 
those of  the author alone and do not reflect the official policy or opinion of  the Public International Law & Policy 
Group or of  the U.S. Government. 
2 H.R. rep. no. 111-186, at 48 (2009).
3 Id. at 48–49.
4 Id at 49.
5 Id. at 48 (noting “with concern the blurred distinction between the intelligence-gathering activities carried out of  the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the clandestine operations of  the Department of  Defense”).
6 See Siobhan Gorman, Drones Evolve Into Weapon in Age of  Terror, wall sT. J., Sept. 8, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424053111904836104576556952946952670 (claiming that the CIA and the military split drone 
strike responsibilities, with the military conducting strikes in Afghanistan and the CIA conducting them in Pakistan); see 
also Greg Miller, Joint Strike Is Latest Example of  CIA-Military Convergence, wash. posT, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1 (noting that 
a combined CIA and Joint Special Operations Command drone strike killed al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader 
Anwar Al-Awlaki).
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authorized the SEAL Team Six operation resulting in al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s death is 
perhaps even more illustrative of  this military-intelligence convergence.7 In the aftermath of  the 
operation, CIA Director Leon Panetta unequivocally asserted that the raid was a “Title 50 operation, 
which is a covert operation;” that he was in “command” of  the mission; and that Vice Admiral 
William McRaven “was actually in charge of  the military operation.”8
Seemingly ambiguous terms like OPE and those used by Director Panetta can be confusing 
and are often misused.9 These terms are legal terms of art and part of the larger legal framework 
that authorizes and provides for executive and congressional oversight of  military and intelligence 
operations. Given the increasing number of  mixed CIA-DoD operations, establishing clear 
definitions for these terms and then using them appropriately is crucial for the national security of  
the United States.
A significant portion of  this legal framework is found in Title 10 and Title 50 of  the United 
States Code.10 Unfortunately, given both the plain language and the various interpretations of  these 
statutes, many terms within these statutes are inherently ambiguous. This ambiguity has become 
further exacerbated due to the convergence of  military and intelligence personnel and operations11 
and the previously mentioned problem of  the DoD’s classification of  some of  its activities such 
as OPE. When combined with the reality of  the current “armed conflict” against al Qaeda and its 
affiliates,12 the intricacies of  the Title 10/Title 50 debate and the military-intelligence convergence 
provide a challenging set of  legal and policy issues regarding exactly when and under what 
circumstances the DoD must receive presidential authorization and when it must notify the proper 
channels of  congressional oversight.
This paper seeks to provide a certain level of  clarity to the Title 10/Title 50 debate, particularly 
7 Interview by Jim Lehrer with Leon Panetta, Director of  CIA, on PBS Newshour (May 3, 2011), available at http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/jan-june11/panetta_05-03.html; see also Matthew C. Dahl, Event Summary: The 
Bin Laden Operation – The Legal Framework, A.B.A. (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/law_national_security/covert_action_event.authcheckdam.pdf.
8 Interview by Jim Lehrer with Leon Panetta, supra note 7.
9 See, e.g., Dana Priest, CIA Killed U.S. Citizen in Yemen Missile Strike; Action’s Legality, Effectiveness Questioned, wash. 
posT, Nov. 8, 2002, at A1 (describing a CIA drone strike as a “covert military action”) (emphasis added); Sarah Miller, 
Covert Action and the War on Terror: Reconciling Secrecy and Public Legitimacy, 31 A.B.A. naT’l. sec. l. rep. 1, Jan./Feb. 2009, 
at 16, 18, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/law_national_security/
nslr_january_february_2009.authcheckdam.pdf  (claiming that because legal constraints to covert action are complex, are 
defined by executive branch lawyers, and are rarely litigated, they are nearly unknown to the general public).
10 See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 101-18505 (2012) (“Armed Forces”); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-2932 (2006) (“War and National 
Defense”).
11 See, e.g., Priest, supra note 9 (describing a CIA drone strike as a “covert military action”) (emphasis added).
12 See George W. Bush, President of  the United States, Address to a Joint Session of  Congress and the American 
People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.
html (“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group 
of  global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”); see also Letter from Barack Obama, President of  the United 
States, to Congress on the War Powers Resolution (Jun. 15, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/06/15/letter-president-war-powers-resolution (“As necessary, in response to the terrorist threat, I will direct 
additional measures against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces to protect U.S. citizens and interests. It is not 
possible to know at this time the precise scope or the duration of  the deployments of  U.S. Armed Forces necessary to 
counter this terrorist threat to the United States.”).
with regard to the DoD’s use of  OPE. Section IIA defines OPE and demonstrates its utility in 
the fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates. Section IIB describes the broader legal framework and 
clarifies the key terms in the Title 10/Title 50 debate, such as “intelligence activity,” “covert action,” 
and “traditional military activity.” Section IIC recognizes the potential congressional oversight 
issues facing the DoD due to the blurring of  Title 10 and Title 50 authorities. Section III places 
OPE within the Title 10/Title 50 framework and emphasizes that DoD’s classification of  OPE as a 
traditional military activity is consistent with its authority.
II. analysis
A. Defining Operational Preparation of the Environment
Before analyzing the more convoluted questions of  legal authorization and congressional 
oversight over military and intelligence activities, a generalized understanding of  the term 
“Operational Preparation of  the Environment” and its use is necessary. The exact definition of  the 
term “Operational Preparation of  the Battlefield” is classified. Nevertheless, sufficient information 
about OPE can be gleaned from related terms and unclassified publications about OPE to provide a 
generalized understanding of  the term and its use. 
The Department of  Defense Dictionary of  Military and Associated Terms does not define OPE itself;13 
however, it defines “Preparation of  the Environment” as “an umbrella term for operations and 
activities conducted by selectively trained special operations forces to develop an environment for 
potential future special operations.”14 Furthermore, the term “OPE” appears to have evolved from 
the term “Operational Preparation of  the Battlespace” (OPB).15 An older United States Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM) definition describes OPB as
 
                    
Non-intelligence activities conducted prior to D-Day, H-hour, in 
likely or potential areas of  employment, to train and prepare for fol-
low-on military operations. OPB consists of  both pre-crisis activities 
and, when authorized, advance force operations. OPB complements 
intelligence operations in the overall preparation of  the battlespace. 16
Based on its heritage, OPE is likely the new OPB with a less menacing and more forward-
thinking name. 
After discovering that his special operations forces required CIA assistance to enter Afghanistan 
13 Interestingly, although the term “Operational Preparation of  the Environment” is not defined in the current 
version of  the Department of  Defense Dictionary of  Military and Associated Terms, the acronym “OPE” is included in 
Appendix A’s list of  acronyms. J. Publ’n 1-02, Department of  Defense Dictionary of  Military and Associated Terms, Appendix A 
(Nov. 8, 2010) (as amended through Mar. 15, 2013), available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
14 Id. at 225.
15 See Jennifer D. Kibbe, Conducting Shadow Wars, 5 J. naT’l sec. l. & pol’y 373, 380 (2012) (tracing the term 
“preparing the battlefield” to the term “operational preparation of  the environment”).
16 Michael S. Repass, Combating Terrorism with Preparation of  the Battlespace 32 (2003), available at http://www.fas.org/
man/eprint/respass.pdf  (citing SOCOM definition of  OPB).
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after September 11, 2001,17 then-Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld pushed for a greater 
special operations role in OPE.18 Indeed, OPE is inherently a special operations activity.19 SOCOM 
is one of  the few Combatant Commands with global reach and capabilities.20 U.S. special operations 
personnel have a “unique ability to simultaneously blend direct and indirect approaches” which is 
critical in OPE,21 as special operations forces specialize in “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint 
approaches to achieve [U.S.] security objectives.”22
Functionally, OPE is primarily an enabling tactic that facilitates future military operations.23 It is 
an amalgam of  lesser activities combined to minimize surprise and manage uncertainty by leveraging 
the capabilities and assets at the disposal of  special operations forces to shape the environment. 
The “environment” that is being shaped, or “prepared,” includes both the physical environment and 
“human terrain.”24 
OPE is made up of  three major substantive components: 1) orientation activities, 2) target 
development, and 3) preliminary engagement.25 Orientation activities include situational awareness, 
surveys and assessments, and knowledge of  the quickest routes to and from objectives and potential 
17 See Jim Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations, CIA, Address to Duke University Law School Conference (Apr. 11, 
2002), available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2002/pavitt_04262002.html (claiming 
that CIA paramilitary officers were some of  the first into Afghanistan after 9/11 and that they paved the way for special 
operations personnel); Dana Priest, “Team 555” Shaped a New Way of  War; Special Forces and Smart Bombs Turned Tide and 
Routed Taliban, wash. posT, Apr. 3, 2002, at A1 (describing how CIA operatives were inserted before special operations 
forces to “designate landing zones, secure safe houses, vet anti-Taliban commanders, and supply their troops with 
weapons, communications gear, medical supplies, and clothing”).
18 See Gordon Corera, Special Operations Forces Take Care of  War on Terror, Jane’s inTelligence rev., Dec. 13, 2002, 
at 1-2; Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of  the Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. naT’l sec. l. & 
pol’y 539, 563 (2012); see also Rowan Scarborough, Special Operations Forces Eye Terrorists, Command Draws Up War Plan, 
wash. Times, Aug. 12, 2005 (noting that some geographic combatant commanders have objected to special operations 
personnel operating outside of  their chain of  command when they are located in their geographical jurisdiction). 
19 See Repass, supra note 16, at 9 (“The term OPB is seldom used outside of  Special Operations Forces channels.”); see 
also Corera, supra note 18 (describing the highly specialized nature of  special operations forces and their ability to work 
in non-traditional capacities); Linda Robinson, Plan of Attack: The Pentagon Has a Secret New Strategy for Taking on Terrorists 
– and Taking Them Down, u.s. news & world rep. (Aug. 1, 2005), available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/
articles/050801/1terror.htm (describing SOCOM as the global “synchronizer” in the war on terror, responsible for 
“conducting preparatory reconnaissance missions against terrorist organizations around the world”).
20 See 10 U.S.C. § 167 (2012); DoD Directive 5100.03, supporT of The headquarTers of combaTanT and 
subordinaTe unified commands, Enclosure 3 (2011); Posture Statement of  Adm. William H. McRaven, USN 
Commdr., U.S. Special Ops. Command Before the 112th Congress S. Comm. on Armed Serv. Comm. 10 (Mar. 6, 2012), 
available at http://www.socom.mil/Documents/2012_SOCOM_POSTURE_STATEMENT.pdf.
21 Posture Statement of  McRaven, supra note 20.
22 Id. at 7.
23 Maj. Michael T. Kenny, Leveraging Operational Preparation of  the Environment in the GWOT 3, 6 (May 25, 2006), available 
at http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA450588; Repass, supra note 16, at 
13.
24 Kenny, supra note 23, at 33; see also Repass, supra note 16, at 9 (asserting that preparation of  the battlespace 
consists of  a “full range of  intelligence functions and analytical activities”, the aim of  which is to produce “actionable 
intelligence for executing forces”).
25 Kenny, supra note 23, at 1.
obstacles in between.26 Target development is “a set of activities that acquire and pinpoint a target 
set.”27 As part of  target development, OPE facilitates persistent surveillance “by exploiting regional 
and local expertise and leveraging ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] assets to 
find and fix target sets.”28 Target development may include both overt and clandestine engagement 
with host state counterparts, and cultivating relationships with influential members of  host state 
society.29 Preliminary engagement includes persistent surveillance, terminal guidance, and small-scale 
direct action.30 It also may involve establishing caches and conducting area assessments of  local 
infrastructure.31 
OPE can also be separated into two temporal categories: 1) pre-crisis activities and 2) advance 
force operations.32 Pre-crisis activities are conducted during peacetime and in the time prior to a 
crisis. Pre-crisis activities include unilateral surveys and assessments, cover deployments and area 
visits, and training and engagement events with regional and local allies.33 In contrast, advance force 
operations, which require Secretary of  Defense approval, are undertaken immediately prior to 
conventional forces entering an area of  operations.34 Advance force operations include clandestine 
and source operation, such as “reconnaissance and surveillance; joint reception; staging; onward 
movement; information operations; terminal guidance; and other limited direct action operations.”35
 As former Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld said,
                  
The only way to deal with a terrorist network that’s global is to go after 
it where it is. The [alternative] . . . is to sit there and think you’re going to 
take the blows . . . [G]iven the increasing power and the reach of  weap-
                  ons today, that would be foolhardy and dangerous and self-defeating. 36
OPE provides special operations forces with a tool that brings the fight to al Qaeda and its affiliates. 
In fact, OPE is a particularly useful tool because of  its proactive nature, its ability to reduce the 
targeting timeframe from find to finish, and its human intelligence (HUMINT) character.37 OPE 
is proactive because it provides the DoD with access to and pre-positioned forces in areas of  
anticipated trouble. This forward posture, in turn, enhances the operational reach of  U.S. forces 
by establishing infrastructure with personnel and equipment. Similarly, because special operations 
personnel are already engaged and training in locations of  interest, they have the capacity to rapidly 
26 Id. at 9; Repass, supra note 16, at 13–14.
27 Kenny, supra note 23, at 10.
28 Id. at 9; see also Repass, supra note 16, at 14 (discussing engagement programs to strengthen alliance capabilities).
29 Kenny, supra note 23, at 3, 7, 33.
30 Id. at 12; Repass, supra note 16, at 19.
31 Kenny, supra note 23, at 9.
32 Repass, supra note 16, at 13.
33 Id. at 13–14.
34 Id. at 13, 18.
35 Id. at 9, 13.
36 Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of  Def., News Briefing in Brussels, u.s. dep’T of def. (Dec. 18, 2001), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2667.
37 Kenny, supra note 23, at 2–4.
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set.”27 As part of  target development, OPE facilitates persistent surveillance “by exploiting regional 
and local expertise and leveraging ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] assets to 
find and fix target sets.”28 Target development may include both overt and clandestine engagement 
with host state counterparts, and cultivating relationships with influential members of  host state 
society.29 Preliminary engagement includes persistent surveillance, terminal guidance, and small-scale 
direct action.30 It also may involve establishing caches and conducting area assessments of  local 
infrastructure.31 
OPE can also be separated into two temporal categories: 1) pre-crisis activities and 2) advance 
force operations.32 Pre-crisis activities are conducted during peacetime and in the time prior to a 
crisis. Pre-crisis activities include unilateral surveys and assessments, cover deployments and area 
visits, and training and engagement events with regional and local allies.33 In contrast, advance force 
operations, which require Secretary of  Defense approval, are undertaken immediately prior to 
conventional forces entering an area of  operations.34 Advance force operations include clandestine 
and source operation, such as “reconnaissance and surveillance; joint reception; staging; onward 
movement; information operations; terminal guidance; and other limited direct action operations.”35
 As former Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld said,
                  
The only way to deal with a terrorist network that’s global is to go after 
it where it is. The [alternative] . . . is to sit there and think you’re going to 
take the blows . . . [G]iven the increasing power and the reach of  weap-
                  ons today, that would be foolhardy and dangerous and self-defeating. 36
OPE provides special operations forces with a tool that brings the fight to al Qaeda and its affiliates. 
In fact, OPE is a particularly useful tool because of  its proactive nature, its ability to reduce the 
targeting timeframe from find to finish, and its human intelligence (HUMINT) character.37 OPE 
is proactive because it provides the DoD with access to and pre-positioned forces in areas of  
anticipated trouble. This forward posture, in turn, enhances the operational reach of  U.S. forces 
by establishing infrastructure with personnel and equipment. Similarly, because special operations 
personnel are already engaged and training in locations of  interest, they have the capacity to rapidly 
26 Id. at 9; Repass, supra note 16, at 13–14.
27 Kenny, supra note 23, at 10.
28 Id. at 9; see also Repass, supra note 16, at 14 (discussing engagement programs to strengthen alliance capabilities).
29 Kenny, supra note 23, at 3, 7, 33.
30 Id. at 12; Repass, supra note 16, at 19.
31 Kenny, supra note 23, at 9.
32 Repass, supra note 16, at 13.
33 Id. at 13–14.
34 Id. at 13, 18.
35 Id. at 9, 13.
36 Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of  Def., News Briefing in Brussels, u.s. dep’T of def. (Dec. 18, 2001), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2667.
37 Kenny, supra note 23, at 2–4.
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re-orient and engage emerging targets.38 Through orientation activities and target development, OPE 
also facilitates strikes against time-sensitive and narrow window-of-opportunity targets.39 Finally, 
because it requires special operations forces on the ground in a designated threat area, OPE provides 
the U.S. military with an invaluable HUMINT capability. HUMINT is often the most difficult 
to achieve, and yet most critical, source of  information; in crisis situations, it is direly needed.40 
Ultimately, these three features of  OPE allow the United States to act in preemptive self-defense 
against the terrorist threat.
B. Legal Authorities in the Title 10/Title 50 Debate
As mentioned above, recent events have led both scholars and practitioners to express concern 
about military-intelligence convergence and unclear distinctions between the so-called “Title 10” 
and “Title 50” legal authorities.41 This concern has also extended to special operations forces’ use of  
OPE and DoD’s classification of  OPE as a traditional military activity. To better understand how 
OPE fits into the larger Title 10/Title 50 debate, this Section provides background information on 
the legal framework governing military and intelligence operations and clarifies some of  the key 
terms, particularly “intelligence activity,” “covert action,” and “traditional military activity.”
1. Defining Title 10 Authority
Scholars and practitioners use the term “Title 10 authority” as a catch-all phrase to describe 
the legal authority for military operations.42 Unfortunately, the use of  the term in this manner is 
38 Id. at 9.
39 Id. at 11.
40 See def. sci. bd., dod roles and missions in homeland securiTy iv (2003), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/
awc/awcgate/dod/dsb_hls_roles_v1.pdf  (describing human intelligence collection as “arguably the most critical source 
of  information in the war on terrorism”); sTaff of h. perm. selecT comm. on inTelligence, ic21: The inTelligence 
communiTy in The 21sT cenTury (1996), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-IC21/html/GPO-IC21-9.
html (“In aggregate, the Strategic Intelligence Reviews clearly identify HUMINT as the most important source of  
intelligence for the subjects [terrorism, narcotics, proliferation, and international economics] treated.”).
41 See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 18 at 544, 629 (arguing that the debate is mostly politics); Kibbe, supra note 15, at 384 
(citing Rep. Rush Holt, who expressed concern over a growing number of  activities that fall between Title 10 and Title 
50); Andru E. Wall, Demystifying the Title 10 – Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert 
Action, 3 harv. naT’l sec. J. 85 (2011) (urging Congress to revise the antiquated oversight structure to reflect “our 
integrated and interconnected world”); Jeff  Mustin & Harvey Rishikof, Projecting Force in the 21st Century – Legitimacy and 
the Rule of  Law: Title 50, Title 10, Title 18, and Art. 75, 63 ruTgers l. rev. 1235, 1236 (2011) (“Conventional military 
forces, special operations forces, and intelligence professionals are all operating in the same area of  operations . . . but 
using contradictory legal authorities to do so.”); Ann Scott Tyson, Boots on the Ground, Now Also Eyes; Special Operations 
Forces Are Doing More Intelligence Gathering in Terror War, chrisTian sci. moniTor (Mar. 11, 2004), available at http://www.
csmonitor.com/2004/0311/p01s02-usmi.html (noting that U.S. special operations “are taking on a far more robust and 
independent role in intelligence and undercover operations”); Greg Miller and Julie Tate, Since Sept. 11, CIA’s Focus Has 
Taken Lethal Turn, wash. posT (Sept. 1, 2011), (reporting that personnel in the joint DoD-CIA special operations units in 
Afghanistan “wore civilian clothes and traveled in Toyota Hilux trucks rather than in military vehicles”).
42 Wall, supra note 41, at 91.
misleading because “Title 10 – Armed Forces” does not contain actual operational authorities; 
it merely describes the organizational structure of  the Department of  Defense.43 The U.S. 
military’s true operational authority stems from the United States Constitution and the President’s 
Commander-in-Chief  power.44 
The President’s constitutional power over the Armed Forces is not exclusive. The Constitution 
granted Congress the power to “declare war,” “raise and support armies,” “provide and maintain a 
navy,” and “make rules for the government and regulation of  the land and naval forces.”45 Together 
with Congress’ power over appropriations, these constitutional provisions provide for congressional 
oversight over the U.S. military.46 Congress has exercised its legislative oversight authority over 
the Armed Forces many times throughout U.S. history, perhaps most significantly in the National 
Security Act of  1947,47 Goldwater-Nichols Department of  Defense Reorganization Act of  1986,48 
and the War Powers Resolution of  1973.49
2. Defining Title 50 Authority 
Like the term “Title 10 authority,” Title 50 authority is also a misnomer. Although it is often 
referred to as the CIA’s authority to conduct intelligence operations,50 Title 50 of  the United States 
Code is actually titled “War and National Defense.”51 In fact, the DoD undertakes the majority of  
intelligence activities under Title 50 authorities.52 Thus, the President and the DoD also possess 
significant authority to conduct intelligence operations under Title 50.
The President’s power to conduct intelligence activities stems from his powers as head of  the 
Executive branch53 and as the “sole organ of  the federal government in the field of  international 
relations.”54 In The Federalist No. 64, for instance, John Jay suggested that the treaty-making power 
allowed the President to “manage the business of  intelligence in such a manner as prudence may 
43 See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 101-18505 (2012).
44 U.S. ConsT. art. II, § 2.
45 Id. art. I, § 8.
46 Id. art. I, §§ 8–9.
47 Pub. L. No. 80-235, §§ 201, 205–06, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) (merging the Departments of  War and Navy into the 
“National Military Establishment,” which later became known as the Department of  Defense).
48 Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986) (reorganizing the Department of  Defense to include a new “joint” 
structure of  command and control).
49 Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (2006)).
50 See Miller, supra note 9 (focusing almost exclusively on CIA); Wall, supra note 41, at 91.
51 50 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
52 richard a. besT, Jr., crs rep. for cong., rl 30252, inTelligence and law enforcemenT: counTering 
TransnaTional ThreaTs To The u.s. 4-5 (2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL30252.pdf; see also Greg 
Miller, DIA Sending Hundreds More Spies Overseas, wash. posT (Dec. 1, 2012), available at http://articles.washingtonpost.
com/2012-12-01/world/35585098_1_defense-clandestine-service-cia-spy-agency (noting the massive increase in the 
number of  spies sent abroad and trained by the CIA in 2012 and that these spies will be receiving their assignments from 
the DoD).
53 See U.S. ConsT. art. II, § 1, cl 1.
54 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–21(1936).
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misleading because “Title 10 – Armed Forces” does not contain actual operational authorities; 
it merely describes the organizational structure of  the Department of  Defense.43 The U.S. 
military’s true operational authority stems from the United States Constitution and the President’s 
Commander-in-Chief  power.44 
The President’s constitutional power over the Armed Forces is not exclusive. The Constitution 
granted Congress the power to “declare war,” “raise and support armies,” “provide and maintain a 
navy,” and “make rules for the government and regulation of  the land and naval forces.”45 Together 
with Congress’ power over appropriations, these constitutional provisions provide for congressional 
oversight over the U.S. military.46 Congress has exercised its legislative oversight authority over 
the Armed Forces many times throughout U.S. history, perhaps most significantly in the National 
Security Act of  1947,47 Goldwater-Nichols Department of  Defense Reorganization Act of  1986,48 
and the War Powers Resolution of  1973.49
2. Defining Title 50 Authority 
Like the term “Title 10 authority,” Title 50 authority is also a misnomer. Although it is often 
referred to as the CIA’s authority to conduct intelligence operations,50 Title 50 of  the United States 
Code is actually titled “War and National Defense.”51 In fact, the DoD undertakes the majority of  
intelligence activities under Title 50 authorities.52 Thus, the President and the DoD also possess 
significant authority to conduct intelligence operations under Title 50.
The President’s power to conduct intelligence activities stems from his powers as head of  the 
Executive branch53 and as the “sole organ of  the federal government in the field of  international 
relations.”54 In The Federalist No. 64, for instance, John Jay suggested that the treaty-making power 
allowed the President to “manage the business of  intelligence in such a manner as prudence may 
43 See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 101-18505 (2012).
44 U.S. ConsT. art. II, § 2.
45 Id. art. I, § 8.
46 Id. art. I, §§ 8–9.
47 Pub. L. No. 80-235, §§ 201, 205–06, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) (merging the Departments of  War and Navy into the 
“National Military Establishment,” which later became known as the Department of  Defense).
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51 50 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
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com/2012-12-01/world/35585098_1_defense-clandestine-service-cia-spy-agency (noting the massive increase in the 
number of  spies sent abroad and trained by the CIA in 2012 and that these spies will be receiving their assignments from 
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54 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–21(1936).
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suggest.”55
Nevertheless, as with Title 10 authority, the Constitution also grants Congress some power 
to constrain the President, at least indirectly, through the appropriations clause.56 Yet even Title 
50 legislation recognizes the limitations of  congressional authority to conduct oversight on 
presidentially approved intelligence activities: “Nothing in this title shall be construed as requiring 
the approval of  the congressional intelligence committees as a condition precedent to the initiation 
of  any significant anticipated intelligence activity.”57
3. Defining Key Terms
Arguably, the entire Title 10/Title 50 debate is based upon the differing and controversial 
interpretations of  three key terms: “intelligence activities,” “covert action,” and “traditional military 
activities.” A U.S. government determination that an individual military or intelligence operation 
constitutes either an intelligence activity, covert action, or traditional military activity has a significant 
impact on both the legal authority under which the operation is conducted and the legislative 
notification regime that must be followed. Therefore, a clear understanding of  these terms is key to 
the proper classification of  OPE within the Title 10/Title 50 framework.
a. Intelligence Activities
The term “intelligence activities” is broad.58 Indeed, Executive Order 12,333 merely defined 
intelligence activities in terms of  activities that the Intelligence Community was authorized to 
conduct.59 It authorized the Intelligence Community to conduct all
 
                        
intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of  foreign relations 
and the protection of  the national security of  the United States, includ-
ing the collection of  information; production and dissemination of  
intelligence; counter-intelligence; special activities; administrative and 
support activities within the United States and abroad; and such other 
intelligence activities as the President may direct from time to time.60     
To be helpful, however, a more refined definition of  “intelligence activities” is necessary.
Thus, for the purpose of  the Title 10/Title 50 debate, “intelligence activities” are best defined in 
55 The federalisT no. 64 (John Jay), indep. J. (Mar. 5, 1788), available at http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa64.
htm.
56 U.S. ConsT. art. I, § 9 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of  Appropriations made 
by Law; and a Regular Statement and Account of  the Receipts and Expenditures of  all public Money shall be published 
from time to time.”).
57 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(2) (2006).
58 E.g., id. § 413(f); Exec. Order No. 12,333, United States Intelligence Activities, § 1.4, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,943 (Dec. 4, 1981).
59 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. at 59,943.
60 Id.
the negative. Intelligence activities are those activities that do not amount to covert action,61 but are 
instead “generally considered [to be] clandestine in nature.”62 The Department of  Defense Diction-
ary of  Military and Associated Terms, for example, defines “clandestine operation” as 
 
                          
[a]n operation sponsored or conducted by governmental de-
partments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or 
concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert 
operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of  the oper-
ation rather than on concealment of  the identity of  the sponsor. 63 
Defining intelligence activities as clandestine activities not amounting to covert action adds a layer 
of  specificity that is particularly useful for congressional oversight purposes, which are discussed in 
further detail below. 
b. Covert Action
For the majority of  U.S. history, the term “covert action” remained undefined. Although seem-
ingly unthinkable today, Congress may not have contemplated covert action as within the CIA’s 
purview when the National Security Act of  1947 first created the CIA.64 Instead, what today consti-
tutes “covert action” used to be known as the “fifth function,” in which the CIA was authorized “to 
perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the 
National Security Council may from time to time direct.”65 In fact, the United States only decided 
to add covert operations to its foreign policy repertoire due to the Soviet Union and China’s use of  
covert activities against U.S. interests abroad.66 
Once implemented, however, Congress quickly assented to the use of  these covert operations.67 
These above-mentioned “other functions and duties” later transformed into “special activities” with 
61 See id. § 413a (2006) (“Reporting of  intelligence activities other than covert actions”) (emphasis added); id. § 413b(e) 
(“Covert action . . . does not include activities the primary purpose of  which is to acquire intelligence.”).
62 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 403–04a(f) (“[T]he Director of  the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate the relationships 
between elements of  the intelligence community and the intelligence or security services of  foreign governments or 
international organizations on all matters involving intelligence related to the national security or involving intelligence 
acquired through clandestine means.”); Mustin & Rishikof, supra note 41, at 1240.
63 J. Publ’n 1-02, supra note 13, at 46.
64 l. briTT snider, The agency and The hill: cia’s relaTionship wiTh congress, 1946–2004, 259 (2008).
65 Mustin & Rishikof, supra note 41, at 1242; see also National Security Act of  1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, §102(d)(5), 61 
Stat. 495, 498.
66 naT’l sec. council, nsc 5412/2, ¶ 1, coverT operaTions, (1954), available at http://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d250.
67 Col. Kathryn Stone, “All Means Necessary” – Employing CIA Operatives in a Warfighting Role Alongside Special Operations 
Forces 8 (2003) (suggesting that congressional acquiescence and the legislative history of  the National Security Act of  
1947 provide evidence that the CIA’s mandate includes “covert action”).
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suggest.”55
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to constrain the President, at least indirectly, through the appropriations clause.56 Yet even Title 
50 legislation recognizes the limitations of  congressional authority to conduct oversight on 
presidentially approved intelligence activities: “Nothing in this title shall be construed as requiring 
the approval of  the congressional intelligence committees as a condition precedent to the initiation 
of  any significant anticipated intelligence activity.”57
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interpretations of  three key terms: “intelligence activities,” “covert action,” and “traditional military 
activities.” A U.S. government determination that an individual military or intelligence operation 
constitutes either an intelligence activity, covert action, or traditional military activity has a significant 
impact on both the legal authority under which the operation is conducted and the legislative 
notification regime that must be followed. Therefore, a clear understanding of  these terms is key to 
the proper classification of  OPE within the Title 10/Title 50 framework.
a. Intelligence Activities
The term “intelligence activities” is broad.58 Indeed, Executive Order 12,333 merely defined 
intelligence activities in terms of  activities that the Intelligence Community was authorized to 
conduct.59 It authorized the Intelligence Community to conduct all
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59 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. at 59,943.
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the negative. Intelligence activities are those activities that do not amount to covert action,61 but are 
instead “generally considered [to be] clandestine in nature.”62 The Department of  Defense Diction-
ary of  Military and Associated Terms, for example, defines “clandestine operation” as 
 
                          
[a]n operation sponsored or conducted by governmental de-
partments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or 
concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert 
operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of  the oper-
ation rather than on concealment of  the identity of  the sponsor. 63 
Defining intelligence activities as clandestine activities not amounting to covert action adds a layer 
of  specificity that is particularly useful for congressional oversight purposes, which are discussed in 
further detail below. 
b. Covert Action
For the majority of  U.S. history, the term “covert action” remained undefined. Although seem-
ingly unthinkable today, Congress may not have contemplated covert action as within the CIA’s 
purview when the National Security Act of  1947 first created the CIA.64 Instead, what today consti-
tutes “covert action” used to be known as the “fifth function,” in which the CIA was authorized “to 
perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the 
National Security Council may from time to time direct.”65 In fact, the United States only decided 
to add covert operations to its foreign policy repertoire due to the Soviet Union and China’s use of  
covert activities against U.S. interests abroad.66 
Once implemented, however, Congress quickly assented to the use of  these covert operations.67 
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63 J. Publ’n 1-02, supra note 13, at 46.
64 l. briTT snider, The agency and The hill: cia’s relaTionship wiTh congress, 1946–2004, 259 (2008).
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Executive Orders 11,905,68 12,036,69 and 12,333.70 Since the end of  the Cold War, covert action has 
transformed from preventing the spread of  Communist ideology to preventing harm to the United 
States.71 
The current definition of  covert action is located in Section 503(e) of  the Intelligence Authori-
zation Act for Fiscal Year 1991.72 It defines covert action as “an activity or activities of  the United 
States government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intend-
ed that the role of  the United States government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”73 
Nevertheless, operations that are primarily intelligence collection activities; that constitute traditional 
diplomatic, military, or law enforcement activities; or that provide routine support to these activities; 
avoid the “covert action” label.74
In deciding to “define” covert action through statute for the first time, Congress tried to reas-
sure the Executive branch that it was merely trying to clarify and not expand or limit any executive 
branch authority to conduct “covert action.”75 Although he refrained from vetoing the bill, President 
George H.W. Bush refused to be bound to a legislative definition and argued that a legislative defini-
tion of  covert action was unnecessary.76 He viewed the notification requirement attached to “covert 
action” as impinging on the President’s inherent constitutional authority to withhold certain national 
security information.77 Additionally, he asserted that he would continue to consider “the historic mis-
sion of  the Armed Forces to protect the United States and its interests, influence foreign capabilities 
and intentions, and conduct activities preparatory to the execution of  operations” when determining 
68 Exec. Order No. 11,905, United States Intelligence Activities, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703, 7705 (Feb. 18, 1976).
69 Exec. Order No. 12,036, United States Intelligence Activities, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674, 3692 (Jan. 26, 1978).
70 Exec. Order No. 12,333, United States Intelligence Activities, § 1.4, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,942, 59,953–54 (Dec. 4, 1981) 
(“Special activities means activities conducted in support of  national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned 
and executed so that the role of  the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions 
in support of  such activities, but which are not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, 
policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of  intelligence or related 
support functions.”).
71 snider, supra note 64, at 309–10.
72 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-88, § 503(e), 105 Stat. 429; 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) 
(2006).
73 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e).
74 Id. § 413b(e)(1)–(4).
75 selecT comm. on inTelligence, conference reporT for inTelligence auThoriZaTion acT fiscal year 1991, 
h.r. rep. no. 102-166, at 28 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 243 (Conf. Rep.) (“The conferees further note 
that in defining for the first time in statute the term ‘covert action’ they do not intend that the new definition exclude 
any activity which heretofore has been understood to be a covert action, nor to include any activity not heretofore 
understood to be a covert action. The new definition is meant to clarify the understanding of  intelligence activities that 
require presidential approval and reporting to Congress; not to relax or go beyond previous understandings.”).
76 George H.W. Bush, President of  the United States, Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Year 1991 (Aug. 14, 1991), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19899 (“These provisions 
cannot be construed to detract from the President’s constitutional authority to withhold information the disclosure of  
which could significantly impair foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative processes of  the Executive, or the 
performance of the Executive’s constitutional duties.”).
77 Id.
whether particular military activities constitute covert action.78 
c. Traditional Military Activities
The term “traditional military activities” is best known as an exception to the definition of  
covert action above. Although it remains undefined by statute, the legislative history of  the Intel-
ligence Authorization Act of  Fiscal Year 1991 provides a three-part test to define traditional military 
activities.79 Applied on a case-by-case basis, this test helps determine whether an activity constitutes a 
traditional military activity, thereby avoiding the presidential finding and notification requirements of  
50 U.S.C § 413b.80 According to this conjunctive formula, traditional military activities include those 
undertakings: 
                  
1) By military personnel; 
2) Under the direction and control of  a United States military com-
mander; and 
3) Preceding and related to hostilities which are either anticipated 
(meaning approval has been given by the National Command Authori-
ties for the activities and for operational planning for hostilities) to 
involve U.S. military forces, or where such hostilities involving United 
States military forces are ongoing, and, where the fact of  the U.S. role 
in the overall operation is apparent or to be acknowledged publicly. 81
The first two elements in the three-part test defining a traditional military activity make sense prac-
tically and historically. Congress’ inclusion of  the third element, on the other hand, expanded the 
temporal scope of  the traditional military activity exemption, while also requiring that either the 
President or Secretary of  Defense would have to approve the specific operation to qualify as a tradi-
tional military activity.82 Thus, Congress added a subtle note of  accountability that would encourage 
internal executive branch vetting before traditional military activity decisions would be made.83 
The Conference Committee Report for the Intelligence Authorization Act also noted that activi-
ties meeting these three requirements constitute traditional military activities whether or not U.S. 
sponsorship of  such activities is apparent or later acknowledged.84 This last point is somewhat moot 
because, by definition, an activity in which the U.S. role is apparent or intended to be acknowledged 
publically cannot be a covert action.85 Nevertheless, this emphasis does recognize that traditional mili-
78 Id.
79 H.R. rep. no. 102-166, at 29–30 (1991).
80 See 50 U.S.C. § 413b (2006).
81 Id. (emphasis added).
82 Chesney, supra note 18, at 599.
83 See id. (noting that this requirement would preclude anyone lower in the chain of  command from engaging in an 
“unacknowledged” operation, other than in times of  overt hostilities).
84 H.R. rep. no. 102-166, at 29–30.
85 See 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006) (defining covert activity in situations where the role of  the U.S. government is 
not intended to be made public); see also Chesney, supra note 18, at 595–96 (“[T]he definition of  covert action already 
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tary activities can include clandestine operations.
C. Congressional Oversight Problem of  Title 10/Title 50 Convergence
The true problem with Title 10/Title 50 convergence and confusion is not based on the specific 
operational authorities necessary to approve particular DoD covert or clandestine activities, but is in-
stead based on congressional assertions that the DoD is attempting to avoid congressional oversight. 
Thus, Section II’s definitional splicing of  whether a particular activity is classified as an intelligence 
activity, covert action, or traditional military activity is important because of  the disparate levels of  
oversight requirements that attach to activities carried out under Title 50 as opposed to Title 10.86 
As demonstrated below, Title 50 oversight is strict and laid out in detail. Title 10 oversight, on 
the other hand, is less strenuous. Thus, as with the controversy surrounding OPE, the congressional 
intelligence committees are concerned that the DoD will simply label its activities as traditional mili-
tary activities so as to avoid Title 50 oversight requirements.87 According to the House Intelligence 
Committee, this is problematic, because “[c]landestine military intelligence-gathering operations . . . 
carry the same diplomatic and national security risks as traditional intelligence-gathering activities.”88  
1. Oversight Over Intelligence Activities
Operations determined to constitute “intelligence activities” are subject to strict congressional 
oversight requirements. Section 413 of  Title 50, for example, tasks the President with generally en-
suring that Congress is “kept fully and currently informed of  the intelligence activities of  the United 
States, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity as required by this subchapter.”89 
Additionally, Congress imposes a reporting requirement that includes “all intelligence activities, 
other than a covert action . . . which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for 
or on behalf  of, any department, agency, or entity of  the United States government, including any 
significant anticipated intelligence activity and any significant intelligence failure.”90 
The clear and broadly encompassing language of these statutory provisions suggests that Con-
gress anticipates that the Executive will report all intelligence activities, regardless of  whether carried 
out by the United States or on behalf  of  the United States.91 The reporting requirement also makes 
clear that Title 50 oversight authority applies to all U.S. government departments, agencies, and enti-
ties—not just the CIA.92 It is also notable that the Executive must notify Congress of  any significant 
excluded operations in which the U.S. role was intended to be acknowledged.”).
86 See id. § 413a(a) (intelligence activity reporting requirement), 413b(a) (covert action presidential finding 
requirement), 413b(b) (covert action reporting requirement).
87 selecT comm. on inTelligence, inTelligence auThoriZaTion acT for fiscal year 2010, h.r. rep. no. 111-186, 
at 48 (2009).
88 Id. at 49.
89 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (2006).
90 Id.
91 Id. §§ 413(a)(1), 413a(a)(1).
92 Id. § 413a(a)(1).
anticipated intelligence activities and any significant intelligence failure.93
2. Oversight Over Covert Action
Operations classified as “covert actions” are subject to both a presidential finding and a congres-
sional notification requirement.94 Title 50, section 413b(a) (Presidential findings) affirms, 
                    
The President may not authorize the conduct of  a covert action 
by departments, agencies, or entities of  the United States Govern-
ment unless the President determines such an action is necessary to 
support identifiable foreign policy objectives of  the United States 
and is important to the national security of  the United States . . . .95
The finding must be in writing and specify exactly who is authorized to fund and participate in the 
covert action.96 The finding must also clarify that the covert action does not violate the Constitution 
or any U.S. domestic statute.97
Although no President would authorize any covert operation without determining that it was 
“necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives” and “important to the national security 
of  the United States,”98 the true power behind the presidential finding requirement is that it imposes 
an internal review of  covert operations on the Executive branch and makes it more difficult for the 
President to deny knowledge of  an operation if  it ends in disaster.99 Thus, despite Congress’ lack of  
operational authority, the presidential finding requirement allows Congress to insist on a measure of  
public accountability for covert action that the Executive could otherwise deny.
Section 413(b) of  Title 50 requires the President to keep the congressional intelligence commit-
tees “fully and currently informed” of  all ongoing covert actions.100 It also requires the President to 
report his presidential finding to the intelligence committees “as soon as possible after such approval 
and before the initiation of  the covert action.”101 However, in “extraordinary circumstances affecting 
vital interests of  the United States,” this prior notification requirement can be limited to the so-
called “Gang of  Eight.”102 Although the prior notification requirement is limited in these extreme 
93 Id.
94 Id. §§ 413b(a)(1), 413b(a)(3)-(4), 413b(b)(1), 413b(c)(1), (c)(3).
95 Id. § 413b(a) (emphasis added).
96 Id. § 413b(a)(1), (3)-(4).
97 Id. § 413b(a)(5).
98 Id. § 413b(a).
99 Chesney, supra note 18, at 589 (“The real impact of  the finding requirement, instead, was its procedural aspect, in 
that obliging the President to take this step eliminated the possibility of  denying knowledge in the event of  failure- thus 
harnessing presidential self-interest more directly to the task of  ensuring against unduly risky or ill-conceived covert 
action projects . . . .”).
100 50 U.S.C. § 413b(b).
101 Id. § 413b(c)(1).
102 Id. § 413b(c)(2). The “Gang of  Eight” includes the chairmen and ranking minority members of  both 
congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of  the House of  Representatives, and the 
majority and minority leaders of  the Senate. 
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requirement), 413b(b) (covert action reporting requirement).
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an internal review of  covert operations on the Executive branch and makes it more difficult for the 
President to deny knowledge of  an operation if  it ends in disaster.99 Thus, despite Congress’ lack of  
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cases, it is important to note that, at least under the statutory authority, the President simply cannot 
refuse to notify Congress.103
Like the presidential finding requirement, the congressional notification requirement is about 
Executive accountability. The Executive’s employment of  covert action implies that U.S. national in-
terests are so great that they must be protected outside the normal international legal and diplomatic 
channels.104 Congress justifiably worries that if the President could employ atypical means without 
any political consequences, the Executive would likely be more involved in covert action.105 Thus, al-
though it is not a true substantive constraint, the notification requirement makes presidential “plau-
sible deniability” impossible, thereby increasing Executive accountability to the American public.106 
The timing of  the notification requirement is also important. Since, under normal circumstances, 
the Executive must report its finding authorizing a covert action before undertaking the actual covert 
action, Congress can take both formal (funding) or informal (leaks to the press or disclosure on 
public record) steps to stop or limit covert actions that it deems controversial.107 Interestingly, the 
secrecy surrounding covert action “both makes it easier to initiate and easier to terminate, relative 
to the political consequences of  either authorizing or terminating overt hostilities involving the 
military.”108 
3. Oversight Over Traditional Military Activities
Unlike intelligence activities or covert actions, “traditional military activities” are not subject to 
congressional oversight under Title 50. Instead, they are subject to Title 10 oversight. As demon-
strated below, Title 10 oversight includes both congressional oversight and executive oversight.109 
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees conduct congressional Title 10 oversight 
over traditional military activities. The Armed Services Committees’ primary mechanism of  public 
accountability is the War Powers Resolution, which incidentally is located in Title 50.110 The War 
Powers Resolution contains both consultation and reporting requirements that apply to the “intro-
duction of  United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involve-
103 See generally id. §§ 413, 413(a)(2) (stipulating that the President must provide notification, even if  in de minimis 
form prior to the action in extraordinary circumstances or after the action, providing the reasons for not doing so 
beforehand; non-notification is not an option nor is implied anywhere). But cf. George H.W. Bush, Statement on Signing 
the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, supra note 76 (“These provisions cannot be construed to detract 
from the President’s constitutional authority to withhold information the disclosure of  which could significantly impair 
foreign relations, the national security . . . .”).
104 Stone, supra note 67, at 15.
105 See e.g., Chesney, supra note 18, at 588 (stating that there was a public uproar after the public learned of  the CIA’s 
involvement in preventing Salvador Allende from winning the Chilean presidential election under President Nixon).
106 Chesney, supra note 18, at 588–89.
107 50 U.S.C. § 413b(c)(1) (2006); Chesney, supra note 18, at 589.
108 Chesney, supra note 18, at 589
109 See 50 U.S.C. § 413(c)(1).
110 War Powers Resolution of  1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1541–48 (2006)).
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”111  
However, exactly what military operations constitute “hostilities” is ill-defined in the current 
global armed conflict against al Qaeda and its affiliates and is therefore problematic when determin-
ing whether congressional oversight is appropriate.112 Furthermore, the War Powers Resolution does 
not impose congressional restraints or requirements on military activities that are not “hostilities.”113 
Indeed, military forces operating clandestinely do not have extra legal requirements or precautions 
beyond those that they must undertake anyways for regular military operations.114
Additionally, the level of  specificity required in War Powers Resolution reports does not reach 
the same level of  detail as those required by Title 50 oversight authorities. Under the War Powers 
Resolution, the President only has to submit “the circumstances necessitating the introduction of  
United States Armed Forces; the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduc-
tion took place; and the estimated scope and duration of  the hostilities or involvement.”115 These 
broad categories allow the Executive to speak in broad terms when providing periodic reports 
consistent with the War Powers Resolution.116 President Barack Obama, for instance, spoke in very 
general terms and referenced a classified annex in his June 2011 War Powers report.117 
The Executive branch also maintains internal oversight over the Armed Forces. The Department 
of  Defense has internalized, or perhaps more appropriately “operationalized,” its Title 10 authority 
through DoD Directives, Instructions, Reports, and other publications. Although these documents 
are statements of  policy and are not legally binding, they still constrain DoD actions and provide for 
internal oversight processes. DoD Directive 2311.01E, for example, requires the DoD to conduct all 
military operations in accordance with the laws of  war.118 
Despite the dual nature of  Title 10 oversight, some scholars worry that Title 10 is an insufficient 
accountability mechanism in the face of  Executive power.119 L. Britt Snider, for example, snubs the 
oversight role of  the House and Senate Armed Service Committees and suggests that the intelli-
111 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (2006) (consultation requirement); id. at § 1543(a) (requiring a written report, in the absence 
of  a declaration of  war, “in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced 1) into hostilities or into 
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances; 2) into the territory, 
airspace or waters of  a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, 
replacement, repair, or training of  such forces”).
112 Chesney, supra note 18, at 543–44.
113 See id. at 588.
114 Maj. Keith A. Pellegrini, Operateurs Sans Frontiers: SOF’s Answer to the Transnational Terrorist Threat 7 (Feb. 14, 2005).
115 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(3)(A)–(C) (2006).
116 Id. § 1543(c).
117 See, e.g., Letter from Barack Obama, President of  the United States, to Congress on the War Powers Resolution 
(Jun. 15, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/15/letter-president-war-powers-
resolution.
118 dod direcTive 2311.01E, dod law of war program, ¶ 4.1 (2006) (certified current as of  Feb. 22, 2011) 
(“Members of  the DoD components comply with the law of  war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are 
characterized, and in all other military operations.”) (emphasis added).
119 See snider, supra note 64, at 310 (citing the President’s ability to delay or limit notice to Congress as well as the 
President’s use of  the Contingency Reserve Fund, which does not require congressional approval); Chesney, supra note 
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cases, it is important to note that, at least under the statutory authority, the President simply cannot 
refuse to notify Congress.103
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107 50 U.S.C. § 413b(c)(1) (2006); Chesney, supra note 18, at 589.
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ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”111  
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ing whether congressional oversight is appropriate.112 Furthermore, the War Powers Resolution does 
not impose congressional restraints or requirements on military activities that are not “hostilities.”113 
Indeed, military forces operating clandestinely do not have extra legal requirements or precautions 
beyond those that they must undertake anyways for regular military operations.114
Additionally, the level of  specificity required in War Powers Resolution reports does not reach 
the same level of  detail as those required by Title 50 oversight authorities. Under the War Powers 
Resolution, the President only has to submit “the circumstances necessitating the introduction of  
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tion took place; and the estimated scope and duration of  the hostilities or involvement.”115 These 
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The Executive branch also maintains internal oversight over the Armed Forces. The Department 
of  Defense has internalized, or perhaps more appropriately “operationalized,” its Title 10 authority 
through DoD Directives, Instructions, Reports, and other publications. Although these documents 
are statements of  policy and are not legally binding, they still constrain DoD actions and provide for 
internal oversight processes. DoD Directive 2311.01E, for example, requires the DoD to conduct all 
military operations in accordance with the laws of  war.118 
Despite the dual nature of  Title 10 oversight, some scholars worry that Title 10 is an insufficient 
accountability mechanism in the face of  Executive power.119 L. Britt Snider, for example, snubs the 
oversight role of  the House and Senate Armed Service Committees and suggests that the intelli-
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gence committees provide the “only significant check and balance outside the executive branch.”120 
Similarly, Jennifer Kibbe notes that in 2009 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence had forty-
five staffers tasked solely with analyzing the intelligence budget while the Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Defense had just five staffers assigned to intelligence issues, in addition to their 
other responsibilities.121 Additionally, Robert Chesney worries that internal Executive branch over-
sight is a weak form of  accountability, because the Secretary of  Defense has an institutional com-
mitment to the interests of  the Department of  Defense. Therefore, he may not be as privy to, nor 
carefully police, the foreign or domestic political risks involved in a particular operation, that are 
outside his purview.122
iii. operaTional preparaTion of The environmenT and TiTle 10/TiTle 50 convergence
The question of  exactly where OPE fits into the Title 10/Title 50 debate is difficult. In fact, 
one scholar claimed that OPE embodies “the fundamental problem” of  intelligence-military con-
vergence.123 The legal architecture of  the Title 10/Title 50 debate, as explained above in Section II, 
should provide a clear mechanism to resolve the problem. Unfortunately, the problem of  classifying 
OPE within the Title 10/Title 50 debate is less about clarifying the legal framework of  Title 10 and 
Title 50 than it is about the breadth of  the various lesser activities that combine to form the amor-
phous concept of  OPE. Contrasting OPE and intelligence activities as “different authorities, some-
what different purposes, [and] mostly indistinguishable activities,” during his nomination hearing, Air 
Force General Michael V. Hayden seems to agree.124
The viewpoints of  the main stakeholders in the debate are illustrative of  this confusion. The 
House Intelligence Committee describes the purpose of  OPE operations as intelligence gathering 
and is concerned that DoD is not properly accountable to the legislature.125 It also questions the tra-
ditional military activity label as disingenuous.126 It may have a point, particularly since the CIA has 
performed OPE, or at minimum OPE-like, activities in the past.127
Executive branch officials, on the other hand, have expressed publicly their opinion that OPE 
does not fall under Title 50 oversight authority. The DoD does not consider OPE operations as 
intelligence collection and further claims that OPE is not covert action.128 Instead, it suggests that 
OPE is a traditional military activity; therefore, OPE falls within the traditional military activity 
exception to congressional notification requirements for covert action and does not need to be 
120 snider, supra note 64, at 310.
121 Kibbe, supra note 15, at 383.
122 Chesney, supra note 18, at 605.
123 Chesney, supra note 18, at 611.
124 Nomination of  General Michael V. Hayden, USAF to Be Director of  the Central Intelligence Agency: Hearing Before the 
S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. 124 (2006), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/109808.pdf  
(statement of  Gen. Hayden).
125 h.r. rep. no. 111-186, at 48–49 (2009).
126 See id. (expressing hope that the DoD will be more “fulsome” in its reporting in the future).
127 See Green Berets Take on Spy Duties, wash. Times, Feb. 19, 2004; Chesney, supra note 18, at 563.
128 marshall curTis erwin, cong. research serv., coverT acTion: legislaTive background and possible policy 
quesTions 9 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33715.pdf.
reported to the intelligence committees.129 During his confirmation hearing before the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, CIA Director Panetta agreed.130 He recognized that “military operations 
or ‘preparation of  the environment’ – though clandestine in nature – are operations that, if  discov-
ered, could not be officially denied by the U.S. government.”131
A. Subjecting Operational Preparation of  the Environment to the Traditional Military Activity Test
Ultimately, subjecting OPE to the conjunctive traditional military activity definition expounded 
in Section II suggests that the DoD is likely correct in asserting that OPE constitutes a traditional 
military activity. To recount, a traditional military activity is an activity undertaken
                  
1) By military personnel; 
2) Under the direction and control of  a United States military com-
mander; and 
3) Preceding and related to hostilities which are either anticipated 
(meaning approval has been given by the National Command Authori-
ties for the activities and for operational planning for hostilities) to 
involve U.S. military forces, or where such hostilities involving United 
States military forces are ongoing, and, where the fact of  the U.S. role 
in the overall operation is apparent or to be acknowledged publicly. 132
Consistent with the first element, OPE is certainly undertaken by special operations personnel.133 
Special operations personnel are specifically authorized to carry out “counterterrorism” operations 
and “such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of  Defense.”134
Second, special operations forces operate under the direction and control of  SOCOM.135 
SOCOM is a combatant command.136 According to Title 10, section 164(b)(2)(A), commanders of  
combatant commands perform their duties “[s]ubject to the direction of  the president . . . under the 
authority, direction, and control of  the Secretary of  Defense.”137 
Finally, consistent with the third element, special operations personnel undertake OPE preceding 
129 Id.
130 Nomination of  the Honorable Leon E. Panetta to Be Director of  the Central Intelligence Agency: Hearing Before the S. Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, 111th Cong. 94–95 (2009), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/111172.pdf  
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133 See Repass, supra note 16, at 9 (“The term OPB is seldom used outside of  Special Operations Forces channels.”); 
Corera, supra note 18; Robinson, supra note 19 (describing SOCOM as responsible for “conducting preparatory 
reconnaissance missions against terrorist organizations around the world”).
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135 See id. § 167(a)–(d).
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States military forces are ongoing, and, where the fact of  the U.S. role 
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Consistent with the first element, OPE is certainly undertaken by special operations personnel.133 
Special operations personnel are specifically authorized to carry out “counterterrorism” operations 
and “such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of  Defense.”134
Second, special operations forces operate under the direction and control of  SOCOM.135 
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and related to anticipated hostilities. In this case, OPE activities precede and are related to antici-
pated hostilities against al Qaeda and its affiliates. OPE is, by definition, a preparatory activity.138 
General Hayden described operational preparation of  the battlefield as “the ability of  Defense to get 
into an area and know it prior to the conduct of  military operations.”139
With regard to the anticipated sub-element, it seems quite likely that “a great deal of  opera-
tional planning for overt operations against an array of  transnational terrorist entities has been 
authorized,”140 particularly given President George W. Bush’s proclamation of  a Global War on Ter-
ror.141 In fact, the U.S. military, special operations forces in particular, may have been authorized to 
conduct attacks against al Qaeda and its affiliates outside of  war zones since the promulgation of  a 
classified order, reportedly named the “Al Qaeda Network Execute Order (ExOrd)” in late 2003 or 
early 2004.142 This order supposedly streamlined the approval process for operations that were time 
sensitive and not located in Iraq or Afghanistan, but in fifteen to twenty other states.143 Even with 
the order, high-level approval – at minimum Secretary of  Defense authorization – had to be pro-
vided on a case-by-case basis.144
B. The Implications of Operational Preparation of the Environment as a 
Traditional Military Activity
Despite the intelligence committees’ concerns about OPE’s classification as a traditional military 
activity, as demonstrated in Section II, OPE activities do not escape congressional oversight under 
the Title 10 paradigm. The Armed Services Committees all but specifically declare their oversight au-
thority over OPE. The House Armed Services Committee has jurisdiction over “tactical intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of  the Department of  Defense.”145 Likewise, the Senate Armed 
Services’ Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities has specific oversight responsibility 
for counterterrorism policies and programs, special operations programs, and emerging operational 
concepts.146 Additionally, as of  March 1, 2012, the Secretary of  Defense must provide Armed Ser-
vices Committees with quarterly briefings on DoD counterterrorism operations and related special 
138 Kenny, supra note 23, at 1.
139 Nomination of  General Michael V. Hayden, supra note 124, at 124 (emphasis added) (statement of  Gen. Hayden).
140 Chesney, supra note 18, at 604.
141 George W. Bush, supra note 12.
142 Kibbe, supra note 15, at 376; Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, Secret Order Lets U.S. Raid Al Qaeda, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
10, 2008, at A8; Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, “Top Secret America”: A Look at the Military’s Joint Special Operations 
Command, wash. posT, Sept. 2, 2011.
143 Schmitt & Mazzetti, supra note 142.
144 Priest & Arkin, supra note 142.
145 h. comm. on armed services, 112Th congr., oversighT plan, 2–3 (2012), available at http://armedservices.
house.gov/index.cfm/oversight-plan (citing clause 1(c) of  rule X of  the Rules of  the House of  Representatives).
146 s. comm. on armed services, 112Th congr., subcommiTTee sTrucTure for The commiTTee on armed services 
(2012), available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/SASC%20SUB%20STRUCTURE%20112TH.pdf; see also 
h. commm. on armed services, abouT The subcommiTTee on emerging ThreaTs and capabiliTies (2012), available at 
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/emerging-threats-and-capabilities.
operations activities.147 These mandated briefings, albeit after the fact, will almost certainly cover 
OPE activities.
In fact, certain OPE activities might even fall under the reporting requirements of  the War 
Powers Resolution, which requires a written report “in any case in which United States Armed Forces 
are introduced . . . into the territory, airspace or waters of  a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, 
except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of  such forces . 
. . .”148 Special operations personnel are certainly equipped for combat when they enter into foreign 
states to conduct OPE. Moreover, although preparation of  the environment may include supply 
and training, it is not exclusively these activities. Thus, the War Powers Resolution may require the 
Executive to notify Congress of  its introduction of  special operations forces into foreign states to 
conduct OPE.
Furthermore, because Secretary of  Defense authorization is required to move OPE activities 
from low-risk pre-crisis activities to “operational preparation and conduct of  counterterrorist or 
other contingency operations,” OPE has a built-in internal accountability mechanism.149 Special op-
erations forces can only conduct more high-risk advance force operations, such as small-scale direct 
action and terminal guidance, after a Presidential or Cabinet-level order.150 These terminal guid-
ance151 and direct action missions152 are likely the OPE operations that most worry the congressional 
intelligence committees and are certainly part of  the rationale behind Congress’ desire for oversight 
authority in the first place.
As Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Thomas 
O’Connell notes, however, the majority of  OPE is non-intrusive, “non-hostile recon [sic].”153 Addi-
tionally, the desired final effect of  OPE is not necessarily, indeed perhaps not typically, the “killing or 
kinetic solution.”154 Instead, the ultimate effect of  OPE is simply “changing or shaping the environ-
ment” in a manner that facilitates future operations.155 In these situations, violence is a “complemen-
tary rather than controlling” means in special operations forces’ toolkit.156
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except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of  such forces . 
. . .”148 Special operations personnel are certainly equipped for combat when they enter into foreign 
states to conduct OPE. Moreover, although preparation of  the environment may include supply 
and training, it is not exclusively these activities. Thus, the War Powers Resolution may require the 
Executive to notify Congress of  its introduction of  special operations forces into foreign states to 
conduct OPE.
Furthermore, because Secretary of  Defense authorization is required to move OPE activities 
from low-risk pre-crisis activities to “operational preparation and conduct of  counterterrorist or 
other contingency operations,” OPE has a built-in internal accountability mechanism.149 Special op-
erations forces can only conduct more high-risk advance force operations, such as small-scale direct 
action and terminal guidance, after a Presidential or Cabinet-level order.150 These terminal guid-
ance151 and direct action missions152 are likely the OPE operations that most worry the congressional 
intelligence committees and are certainly part of  the rationale behind Congress’ desire for oversight 
authority in the first place.
As Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Thomas 
O’Connell notes, however, the majority of  OPE is non-intrusive, “non-hostile recon [sic].”153 Addi-
tionally, the desired final effect of  OPE is not necessarily, indeed perhaps not typically, the “killing or 
kinetic solution.”154 Instead, the ultimate effect of  OPE is simply “changing or shaping the environ-
ment” in a manner that facilitates future operations.155 In these situations, violence is a “complemen-
tary rather than controlling” means in special operations forces’ toolkit.156
147 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 112-81, § 1031, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011).
148 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (2006) (emphasis added).
149 Repass, supra note 16, at 20.
150 Id.
151 Terminal guidance includes “ground-to-air communications for airborne strike forces, laser designation of  targets, 
or ground support for airland or air assaults.” Id. at 19. The DoD defines terminal guidance operations as “those actions 
that provide electronic, mechanical, voice or visual communications that provide approaching aircraft and/or weapons 
additional information regarding a specific target location.” J. Publ’n 1-02, supra note 13, at 289.
152 Direct action missions include the interdiction of  critical communication and transportation nodes, diversionary 
attacks, or deception operations. Repass, supra note 16, at 19. The DoD defines direct action as “[sh]ort-duration strikes 
and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive 
environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage 
designated targets.” J. Publ’n 1-02, supra note 13, at 84.
153 Robinson, supra note 19.
154 Kenny, supra note 23, at 31 (citing Col. Mark Rosengard, USSOCOM OPE Conference (Sept. 12-15, 2005)).
155 Id. at 31; see also Robinson, supra note 19, (describing OPE as “gathering information in trouble sports around the 
world to prepare for possible missions”).
156 Kenny, supra note 23, at 31 (citing Robert D. Kaplan, imperial grunTs, The american miliTary on The ground 
192 (2005)).
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IV. conclusion
Despite academic assertions to the contrary,157 the current legal framework governing Title 10 
and Title 50 operations still functions. Checks and balances exist within the Title 10/Title 50 legal 
framework to keep the Executive branch accountable to the will of  the democratic population. To 
this end, the determination of  whether Title 10 or Title 50 authority is applicable to a particular op-
eration is important and needs to be conscientiously clarified and applied. Yet, although congressio-
nal oversight of  clandestine and covert military operations is important, it is not always the correct 
answer, either legally or practically. 
In the current threat environment, global terrorist groups pose the greatest threat to U.S. secu-
rity. To counter this threat, clandestine operators need the authority and ability to act quickly and de-
cisively. OPE provides special operations forces with a legal and beneficial tool in the United States’ 
arsenal of  traditional military activities against al Qaeda and its affiliates. In the face of  such a rapidly 
evolving and unconventional threat, U.S. leaders must allow the Executive to weigh the potential 
costs and benefits of  shaping the environment, whether through low-risk pre-crisis activities or 
high-risk advance force operations, without undue influence. OPE should not be abandoned simply 
due to congressional discomfort with internal Executive oversight of  traditional military activities.
 
 
157 Wall, supra note 41, at 92 (suggesting that this “stovepiped view” of  the distinction between Title 10 and Title 50 is 
“legally incongruous and operationally dangerous”).
